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An Escape from Reason: Genocide and the
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
NSONGURUA J. UDOMBANA*
"Where we disagree [with the international commission of inquiry] is that this is a genocide
and it has been going on for two years now. We're just dismayed that this commission could
not discover the government's intent. It's clear .... "I
"The reality is that people are being targeted simply on the basis of ethnicity, not on the basis
of religion in this case but on the basis of a sense of African-ness and blackness-even if the
perpetrators are sometimes blacker than those they are targeting."2
I. Introduction
The convoluted and contrived Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur (ICID) has facilitated the criminal ambivalence of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council (UNSC) and other international actors in suppressing the ongoing genocide in
Darfur, Western Sudan. The ICID's legal reasoning merely hides the political motive un-
derpinning its Report and reflects the mindset of an international community that, hitherto,
has been reluctant to characterize genocide in situations similar to Darfur, to avoid trig-
gering obligations entailed under the Genocide Convention'-the obligation to prevent,
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Africa); Associate Professor, Central European University (CEU), Budapest; udombanan@ceu.hu. Professor
Udombana, who also is Director of the CEU Center for Human Rights, writes on international law and the
judicial process, with an Afrocentric outlook. The author thanks the editors of The International Lawyer for
their invaluable editorial assistance, though the customary disclaimer applies.
1. Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Darfur Report (PBS television broadcast Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/africa/jan-june05/sudan-2-02.html (recounting statement by Salih Booker, Executive Director
of Africa Action).
2. Samantha Power, Analysis: Fulfilling A Responsibility to Protect: What Will it Take to End the 'Age of Genocide'
(United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, May 4, 2004), http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/analysis/details.
php?content = 2004-05-04&page = 1 &menupage = History&Concept [hereinafter Power, Analysis].
3. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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suppress, and punish genocide.4 Often, states do not have the will to apply their political
and military power to prevent and suppress genocide5 and this clearly is the case in Darfur,
where powerful states and institutions that could have stepped in to make a difference have
become accessories to acts of genocide.
On September 18, 2004, the UNSC, acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter,
6
adopted Resolution 15661 requesting the UN Secretary-General to establish an interna-
tional commission of inquiry
in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law
[IHL] and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of
genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to
ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.'
The ICID consisted of five persons-Antonio Cassese, Mohamed Fayek, Hina Jilani,
Dumisa Ntsebeza, and Therese Striggner-Scott-with Cassese, former President of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as its Chairperson. It
began its work on October 24, 2004, holding
extensive meetings with representatives of the Government, the Governors of the Darfur States
and other senior officials in the capital and at provincial and local levels, members of the armed
forces and police, leaders of rebel forces, tribal leaders, internally displaced persons, victims and
witnesses of violations, [non-governmental organizations] and United Nations representatives.'
On January 25, 2004-exactly three months after its inauguration, the ICID submitted
its Report to the Secretary-General. The Report addressed four main issues: violations of
IHL and human rights by all parties to the Darfur crisis; whether or not acts of genocide
have taken place in Darfur; the identification of perpetrators; and accountability mecha-
nisms.' 0 Based on these templates, the ICID concluded that crimes against humanity and
war crimes have been committed in Darfur justifying prosecution by the International
Criminal Court (ICC). This conclusion was hardly surprising, given the high level of
atrocities that defined Darfur since early 2003, including murder, torture, forced disap-
pearances, rape and other sexual violence, forced displacement, insane destruction of
properties, and pillages." The ICID called on the UNSC to refer the Darfur situation
4. See id. arts. 1, 8 ("The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide... is a crime under international law
which they undertake to prevent and punish... Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs
of the [UN] to take such action under the Charter of the [UN] as they consider appropriate for the prevention
and suppression of acts of genocide ... "); see generally Payan Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention:
A Challenge to Civilization, 8 HuAv. HUM. RTS. J. 229 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Louis Rene Beres, Genocide, Law and Power Politics, 10 WHITTIER L. REv. 329 (1988).
6. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 39 (empowering the UNSC to determine the existence of any threat to the
peace or breach of the peace and to make recommendations or decide on measures necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security).
7. S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc/S/Res/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004).
8. Id. T 12.
9. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON DARFUR, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY ON DARFUR TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL 2 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://
www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com-inq-darfur.pdf[hereinafter ICID Report].
10. See id. $ 2-10.
11. See generally AMNESTY INT'L USA, SUDAN: CONTINUING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AI Index: AFR 54/
038/2005, Apr. 13, 2005, available at http://www.amnesty.org; Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan, 16
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to the ICC, 1 which the UNSC did in March 2005 when it adopted another chapter VII
resolution mandating the ICC Prosecutor to investigate the Darfur situation and prosecute
those that have committed grave crimes therein. 3 The ICID, however, was ambivalent on
the question of genocide: though it found the existence of some objective elements of
genocide, it concluded that there was no genocidal intent by the Government of Sudan
(GoS).
This Article examines the ICID Report, in particular its conclusion on the question of
genocide, and insists that the atrocities in Darfur are not only war crimes and crimes against
humanity but also that the Khartoum-Janjaweed criminal alliance has resulted in geno-
cide-"the crime of crimes" 4-against black Africans, mostly the Fur, Masalit, and Zagh-
awa tribes, in Darfur. The harvest of atrocities in Darfur "has developed serious racial and
ethnic overtones and clearly risks shattering historic if fragile patterns of co-existence."5
Until the current conflict, the term African had little relevance in Darfur; but many of the
Fur, Zaghawa and other victims of the GoS-militia attacks now increasingly identify them-
selves as African in contradistinction to their Arab attackers.' 6
It may well be that the gap between crimes against humanity and genocide has narrowed
in recent years and that it is easier, from a prosecutor's standpoint, to prove the former
than the latter;" but if, as William Schabas emphasizes, "the result is to insist upon the
supreme heinousness of 'racial hatred', for want of a better term, and to reiterate society's
condemnation of... mass killings..., [then] the distinction retains and deserves all of its
significance."" The infinite preciousness of life requires more than a muted reaffirmation.
A genocide characterization of the Darfur atrocities probably would have compelled the
international community to suppress the ongoing genocide through humanitarian military
intervention, 9 and to hold its perpetrators accountable. It is immaterial, for the present
Hum. RTs. WATCH 1 (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudanO4O4/sudan0004.pdf
[hereinafter Darfur in Flames); Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western
Sudan, 16 Hum. RTs. WATCH I (May 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudanO504/sudan
0504full.pdf.
12. ICID Report, supra note 9, ' 647 (noting that the Darfir crimes meet all the thresholds of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, entry into force July 1, 2002, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), corrected through May 8, 2000, by UN Doc.
CN.177.2000.TREATIES-5 [hereinafter ICC Statute or Rome Statute]).
13. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc/S/Res/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
14. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, judgment & sentence, T 16 (Sept. 4, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Serashugo, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, sentence, 15 (Feb. 2, 1999).
15. Darfur in Flames, supra note 11, at 7-8; see also Linnea D. Manashaw, Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: Why
the Distinction? A Discussion in the Context of Atrocities Occurring in Sudan, 35 CAL. W INrr'L L.J. 303, 306 n.17
(2005) (stressing that the Africanization of Darfur is a "troubling sign of the increasing polarizing effect of the
conflict").
16. See GgRARr PrUNIER, DARFUR: THE AMBIGUOUs GENOCIDE 4-8 (2005); ALEx DE WAAL, FAmINE THAT KSLLs:
DARFUR, SUDAN xiv (2005); Matthew Happold, Darfur, the Security Council, and the International Criminal Court
55 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 226,226 (2006) ("The population of Darfur is Muslim but recent political developments
have stressed ethnic divisions between 'Arabs' and 'Africans''); Darfur in Flames, supra note 11, at 7-8 (noting
that Darfurians "increasingly see the attacks on their communities by the Sudanese government as racially and
ethnically motivated ones").
17. See WILLIAM A. ScHABAs, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2000) (arguing that the practical con-
sequences of the distinction are now less important).
18. Id.
19. On the question of humanitarian military intervention (HMI) in the context of Darfur, see Nsongurua
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argument, that the UNSC has already made a referral of the Darfur crimes to the ICC,2°
particularly as Resolution 1593 deliberately avoided the term genocide.
Since war crimes and crimes against humanity are taken as given in Sudan, this Article
will focus on the problem of genocide. It begins by introducing genocide as an international
crime, proceeds to examine the findings and conclusion of the ICID on the question of
genocide in Darfur, and argues that its conclusion goes against the weight of evidence in
Darfur and the existing jurisprudence on genocide, leaving unanswered many relevant ques-
tions from the point of view of international law.
II. Genocide and International Law
Though the word genocide is of comparatively recent origin, the reality of genocide
dates beyond the twentieth century. This Part briefly looks at scenarios of genocide and
examines its prohibition and punishment in international law.
A. SCENARIOS OF GENOCIDE
Genocide is both ancient and modem; as Leo Kuper writes, "[tihe word is new, the crime
ancient."' The Holocaust was probably "the most infamous and abominable [modem]
example of genocide,"22 epitomizing man's proclivity towards infinite evil; but modem his-
tory has been one of recurring genocide:
the extermination of Tasmanian and other Australian aboriginals in the nineteenth century,
the forced removal and elimination of American Indians in the United States over the past two
hundred years, the German Vernichtungsbefehl, or extermination order, and subsequent virtual
annihilation of the Heroro in Namibia in 1904, the Turkish extermination of the Anatolian
Americans in 1915 and contemporary massacres of Indians in the Americas, Tutsi in Rwanda,
[and] Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.23
During the Holocaust, Adolf Hitler literally translated Dante's Divine Comedy-with
its tortured portrait of hell-into reality. As Monty Penkower reflected, "[o]nce the Third
J. Udombana, When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan,
27 HUM. RTS. Q. 1149 (2005) (arguing that the grave and continuing crimes committed in Darfur justify HMI,
given the failure of diplomacy to prize the GoS into halting the mayhem, and denouncing the apparent neutral
posturing by the international community, stressing that such neutrality helps the killers and not the victims);
Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 WHITrER L. REv. 1101 (2005) (urging HMI in Sudan
notwithstanding the absence of categorization of genocide by the ICID).
20. For commentaries on the UNSC referral, see Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur
in the International Criminal Court, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (2005); Happold, supra note 16; Luigi
Condorelli & Annalisa Ciampi, Comments on the Security Council Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC, 3
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 590 (2005).
21. LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USAGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 11 (1981) [hereinafter KUPER,
GENOCIDEI (recalling ancient examples of"horrifying genocidal massacres, such as the terror of Assyrian warfare
in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., when many cities were razed to the ground and whole populations
carried offor brutally exterminated.. . ."); cf Jean-Paul Satre, On Genocide, in CRIMES OF WAR 534, 534(Richard
A. Falk et al. eds., 1971) ("The fact of genocide is as old as humanity.").
22. JOHN R.WD. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGO-
SLAVtA AND RWANOA 99 (2d ed. 2000). On the origins of twentieth century genocide, see, e.g., SVEN LINDQUIST,
EXTERMINATE ALL THE BRUTES (1996) (exposing also the depths of European imperialism and racism in Africa).
The phrase "exterminate all the brutes" is from a London Times editorial of 1873.
23. JONES, supra note 22, at 99.
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Reich posited the quintessence of its Weltanschauung on a unique, murderous hatred of all
'non-Aryans'-read Jews-the Nazi progression into the inhuman knew no limits. '2 4 In
the last days of the Final Solution to the Jewish Question, victims were reportedly marched
to nearby forests, gravel pits and Jewish cemeteries where
executions were carried out with savagery and sadism, a crying child often being seized from
its mother's arms and shot in front of her, or having its head crushed by a single blow from a
riffle butt. Hundreds of children were thrown alive into pits, and died in fear and agony under
the weight of bodies thrown on top of them.25
There have been other genocides in contemporary times, such as the killings of Bahais2 6
and, despite ICID's Report, the "ongoing genocide" in Darfur.7 The Rwanda genocide,
however, remains "the purest genocide since 1945, and perhaps the single greatest act of
evil since Pol Pot turned Cambodia into a killing field."2 s The exact number of those killed
in that savagery may never be known; estimates range from 500,000 to 1,000,000 Tutsis. 9
Africa has witnessed other genocidal conflicts, due either to civil wars of decolonization 3"
or to struggles for power, as that between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi, or to the repression
of secessionist attempts, as in Nigeria." Each of these conflicts has resulted in the destruc-
tion of scapegoat groups or ideological, ethnic, or religious massacres.32
This "odious scourge," as the Genocide Convention describes genocide," has been a
recurring theme throughout history largely because history itself has been reluctant to
punish it. According to William Schabas, "the Nazis were only among the most recent to
rely confidently on the reasonable presumption that an international culture of impunity
24. Monty N. Penkower, From Holocaust to Genocide, in TOWARDS THE UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTION OF
GENOCIDE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE 129, 129
(Israel W Charney ed., 1984) [hereinafter TOWARDS THE UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE].
25. MARTIN GILBERT, ATLAS OF THE HOLOCAUST 160 (1988); and generally CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, THE
PATH TO GENOCIDE: ESSAYS ON LAUNCHING THE FINAL SOLUTION (1992); ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND
THE HOLOCAUST (1989).
26. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. On Prevention of Discrimination & Protec-
tion of Minorities, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, T 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (1985) (prepared by Benjamin Whitaker).
27. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACT BOOK: SUDAN, available at www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/su.html [hereinafter CIA FACT BOOK].
28. Rwanda, Remembered, ECONOMIST, 27 Mar. 2004, at 11 [hereinafter Rwanda, Remembered]. For an account
of the Rwanda genocide, see generally BILL BERKELEY, THE GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL (2001); ALISON DES
FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999); ALAIN DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GEN-
OCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1995); AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIANCE 1101
(1995).
29. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7 (1994), 1 24. See also generally Final Report of the Committee of Experts
Established Pursuant o UN Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405, 9 Sept. 1994; Report
of the United Nations Special Rapportenr on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/1995/
7, E/CN.4/1996/68.
30. See KUPER, GENOCIDE, supra note 21, at 17 (arguing that the arbitrary delineation of metropolitan do-
mains brought about by colonization "has been a great creator of plural societies, and there have been many
genocides in the process of decolonization or as an early aftermath of decolonization").
31. See id. at 17-18.
32. See id. at 18.
33. See Genocide Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.
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would effectively shelter the most heinous perpetrators of crimes against humanity."14 Para-
doxically, it was also the devastation of the Holocaust that provided the impetus for the
eventual recognition of genocide as a crime in international law and as a basis for its pros-
ecution and possible punishment.3
B. THE PROHIBITION AND PUNISHMENT OF GENOCIDE
Genocide is derived from two root words, the Greek word genos (meaning race, nation,
or tribe)36 and the Latin suffix caedere (meaning killing). The renowned jurist Raphael Le-
mkin first penned the word genocide in 1944, in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe."
Lemkin, a Polish Jew who immigrated to the United States in the 1930s, originally used it
in reference to the Nazi campaigns to exterminate the Jews, gypsies, and other ethnic groups
in what is now regarded as the Holocaust. He defined genocide as an intentional,
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the
life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of
such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions of culture, lan-
guage, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups and the de-
struction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the lives of the individuals
belonging to such groups.... [T]he actions involved are directed against individuals, not in
their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.3"
Lemkin's coinage and definition of genocide received a quick reception in international
law, principally due to "the understanding and support of this idea by the press of the United
States and other countries."39 The word is now generally defined as "any criminal enterprise
seeking to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular kind of human group, as such, by certain
means."- The Genocide Convention,4' adopted almost at the same period genocide itself
was coined, modified Lemkin's definition, defining genocide as
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
" (a) Killing members of the group;
" (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
" (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
34. See SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 17, at 1 (citing Hitler's famous comment,
"who remembers the Armenians?"); and generally Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Historical and Legal Interconnections
Between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust: From Impunity to Retributive Justice, 23 YALE J. INT'L L.
504 (1998).
35. See KUPER, GENOCIDE, supra note 21, at 20; cf. JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEVEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PRACTICE 144 (2003) (noting that the Genocide Convention was "drafted with Nazi atrocities in
mind").
36. See HENRY GEORGE LIDDEL & ROBERT SCOTT, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 344 (1996).
37. See RAPHAEL LEMIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUEOPE (1944) [hereinafter LEMEiN, Axis RULE].
38. Id. at 79.
39. Raphall Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime in International Law, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 145, 149 n.10 (1947).
40. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, judgment, T 550 (Aug. 2, 2001).
41. See Genocide Convention, supra note 3. For literature, see NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CON-
VENTION: A COMMENTARY (1960); Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civi-
lization, 8 HAtv. Hum. RTs. J. 229 (1995); Matthew Lippman, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1985).
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" (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
" (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.42
In the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide case,4 3
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed that genocide is "a crime under inter-
national law involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial
which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which
is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations."-
The Genocide Convention aims at preventing the intentional destruction of entire hu-
man groups. In Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu4S -"the first judicial interpretation of the
enumeration"46-the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) maintained that
the enumeration of groups is ejusdem generis. The enumeration comprises all stable groups
constituted in a permanent fashion and membership that is determined by birth. The acts
that are punishable are: "genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public in-
citement to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; and complicity in genocide. ' '4
The Convention establishes both individual and state responsibility for these acts; it pro-
vides: "[p]ersons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals." 4 This intersection of collective and individual responsibility requires
a careful consideration when attempting to attribute criminal responsibility for the crime.4 9
Genocide is punishable whether it is committed in time of war or peace 0 and no one, in
both cases, is allowed to claim the defense of superior orders or an immunized act of state.
Any person, whether or not connected to a state, can be a perpetrator of genocide, though
only those belonging to the four types of groups mentioned in the proviso to article 2,
namely "a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,""' can be victims of genocide. The
Convention stresses that genocide "shall not be considered as political crimes for the pur-
pose of extradition." 2
42. Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2. On the definition of genocide in the framework of the
ICTY/R and ICC, see E. Fronza, Genocide in the Rome Statute, in EsSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 105 (E Lattanzi & W Schabas eds., 1999).
43. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Advisory Opinion,
1951 I.CJ. 15 (May 28) [hereinafter Genocide case].
44. Id. at 23.
45. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, judgment, (Sept. 2, 1998).
46. Willian A. Schabas, Genocide, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 107, 110 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
47. Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 3.
48. Id. at art. 4 ("Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article Im [i.e.,
conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide;
and complicity in genocide] shall be punished, whether they are constikutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals").
49. See George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the
Darfur Case 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUsT. 539, 545 (2005).
50. See Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1; cf. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No.
ICTR 95-1-T, judgment, T 631 (May 21, 1999) (stressing that genocide is direcrted against "members of a
group," without reference to civilian or military status); Application of the Convention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections,
1996 I.C.J. 595, 1 31.
51. Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2.
52. Id. at art. 7.
SPRING 2006
48 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Although the UN General Assembly condemned genocide in 1946 and included political
groups as objects of genocide," the Genocide Convention excludes political and economic
groups from its ambits, largely due to the historical and political context surrounding its
adoption.54 During the drafting of the ICC Statute, some delegates suggested that the
definition of genocide should be expanded to encompass social and political groups;" but
this suggestion was rejected, with the result that the final provision reflects the Genocide
Convention.
6
Genocide is today generally regarded not just as a crime under international law but also
as a peremptory norm (jus cogens), giving rise to an erga omnes obligation (obligation flowing
to all)." The ICJ took this view in the Genocide case5" and reaffirmed it in Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Co. case.59 The significance of these holdings, from the point of view of the
Darfur holocaust, is that Sudan is bound by the norms in the Genocide Convention-due
to its peremptory character-though the country is not a party to the Convention. Un-
doubtedly, the Genocide Convention is a major component of the contemporary interna-
tional protection of human rights though, regrettably, it "has operated more as a retro-
spective condemnation of the Nazi enterprise than a criminal code for the prospective
enforcement or prevention" of genocide.60
Some commentators insist that the Genocide Convention as "a seriously flawed docu-
ment," on the ground that its "somewhat loose definition of the word genocide, the absence
of any detailed meanings of its provisions has led to serious problems of interpretation." 61
53. See GA Res. 96(1) of Dec. 11, 1946. The resolution has been cited in many judicial decisions, reinforcing
claims that it codifies customary principles. See, e.g., Genocide case, supra note 43, at 370; Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb.&
Mont.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 3, 23 (April 8) [hereinafter Request for
the Indication of Provisional Measures case].
54. See JONEs & POWLES, supra note 35, at 145.
55. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 91 59-72, UN
Doc. A/50/22; and Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Ertablishment of an International Criminal Court,
58-64, UN Doc. A/51/22.
56. See ICC Statute, supra note 12, at art. 6; cf. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia art. 4, May 25, 1993 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993);
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neigh-
boring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 art. 2, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994), amended by S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 165 (1998) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
57. See, e.g., Claudia Annacker, The Legal Regime of "Erga Omnes" Obligations and International Law, 46 AuST.
PUB. INT'L L. 131 (1994); Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 Am.J. INT'L L. 1
(1986).
58. Genocide case, supra note 43, at 23 ( "The first consequence arising from this conception is that the
principles underlying the [Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as
binding on States, even without any conventional obligation.").
59. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.Cj. 3 (Feb. 5) (reaffirming its position
in the Genocide case and indicating that, given the importance of the rights at issue, certain areas exist such as
the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide for which states have obligations towards the entire
international community and not only to another state).
60. Schaack, supra note 19, at 1112.
61. See CLMARE DE TAN & EDWIN SHORTS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 67 (2003)
(arguing further that "the lack of compulsory means of enforcement mechanisms to punish those responsible
for such atrocities has until relatively recently rendered this particular treaty, for all practical purposes, virtually
redundant").
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For Helen Fein, "[t]he most serious problem in restricting oneself to the usage of the
Convention is the Convention's exclusion of mass murder when the victims are annihilated
solely on political grounds."62 Using the UN's definition, Fein continues, the 1965-66 mas-
sacre of an estimated 200,000 to 500,000 "communists" by the Indonesian Army and local
religious authorities could not be called genocide, 63 though Leo Kuper calls them genocidal
massacres.- Furthermore, the offense described in the Genocide Convention tend to be
committed mainly in plural societies; homogeneous societies are structurally modelled to
exclude the possibility of domestic genocide, "unless the term is extended beyond racial,
ethnic and religious groups to include the slaughter of political groups and social classes."61
Some writers have also argued that the obliteration and atomic bombing of World War I166
and even the nuclear element in current deterrence policies could amount to genocide,6
7
propositions that Sydney Bailey regards as perverse.68
Schabas believes that there are undesirable consequences in attempting to enlarge or
dilute the definition of genocide, since such attempts "weakens the terrible stigma associated
with the crime and demeans the suffering of its victims [and that it is also likely to enfeeble
whatever commitment States may believe they have to prevent the crime."69 It is reasonable
to conclude that the Genocide Convention was a mirror image of customary law at the
time of its adoption7° and that its importance has in no way diminished, given its direct
transposition in later international instruments. The Convention is particularly significant
for freeing the concept of genocide "from its association with war and render[ing] it ap-
plicable to the crimes of governments against their own nationals, whether committed in
time of war or in time of peace."" Until January 12, 1951 -when the Convention entered
into force-international norms relating to war crimes did not extend to mass murder and
extermination of a civilian population by its own government, though it prohibited the
massacre of civilians by enemy soldiers during international armed conflict.
7
2
62. Helen Fein, Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses, in TOWARDS THE UNDERSTAND-
ING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, supra note 24, 3, 3-4.
63. See id. at 4 (referencing HAROLD A. CROUCH, THE ARMy AND POLITICS IN INDONESIA 151-57 (1978)).
64. See KutPER, GENOCIDE, supra note 21, at 10.
65. Id. at 187-8.
66. See LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 13-14, 157 (1985) [hereinafter KUPER, ThE PREVENTION
OF GENOCIDE].
67. See id. at 229-40. Emrys Huges also argued, on the occasion of the United Kingdom's ratification of the
Genocide Convention, that if there were another war, persons responsible for the use of nuclear weapons could
be charged with genocide. See Hansard, May 18, 1950, cited in SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 17, at 205.
68. See Sydney Bailey, in Book Reviews, 62 INr'L APE. XXX, 658-59 (1986) (reviewing KER, THE PREVENTION
OF GENOCIDE, supra note 66).
69. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 17, at 9.
70. See Genocide case, supra note 43, at 23; see also Request for the Indication ofProvioiaalMeasures case, supra
note 53, at 3; cf The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, 45, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Res.
808) (referring to the Genocide case and affirming that the Genocide Convention has become part of customary
law).
71. KuPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, supra note 66, at 9.
72. SeejoNEs & POWLES, supra note 35, at 144 (noting that breaches of article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, which protects the civilian population during internal conflicts, were not considered as
war crimes at the time).
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M. Genocide and the ICED Report
The ICID is unambivalent on war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur; but it
is ambivalent on the question of genocide, absolving the GoS of pursuing any genocidal
policy. Its analysis of the jurisprudence on genocide is intensely interesting but its Report
leaves a great deal to be explained, particularly as it fails to apply its premise to a logical
conclusion. This Part joins issues with the ICID on its findings and conclusion on the
question of genocide in Darfur.
A. ICID's FINDINGS
The ICID admits that it based its findings on reports by independent bodies, accounts
by the GoS and rebel groups, and its own "independent investigations to establish the
facts.""7 Its conclusions were "based on the evaluation of the facts gathered or verified
through these investigations, [though] reports from other sources are relied upon for anal-
ysis where the facts reported are consistent with the results of the Commission's own in-
quiry."74 The ICID, instructively, acknowledged limitations in its investigation, including
the impossibility of investigating "all of the many hundreds of individually documented
incidents reported by other sources."" s The result was a selective investigation of "incidents
and areas that were most representative of acts, trends and patterns relevant to the deter-
mination of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and with greater
possibilities of effective fact-finding. 7 6
The Report confirmed that the GoS, in its response to the insurgency, has committed
acts against the civilian population in Darfur. It established "two irrefutable facts about the
situation in Darfur .... 77
Firstly, there were more than one million internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Darfur
(1,65 million according to the United Nations) and more than 200,000 refugees from Darfur
in neighbouring Chad to the East of the Sudan. Secondly, there were several hundred destroyed
and burned villages and hamlets throughout the three states of Darfur.7"
The Report established a clear alliance between the GoS and the Janjaweed militias, an
alliance that has proved an effective machine for heinous crimes. It stated that the Sudanese
army and senior civilian authorities have made "regular supplies of ammunition" to the
militias, which have been used to commit mayhem. 9 The ICID also found that the Sudanese
armed forces have themselves committed vast attacks on civilians in Darfur villages.8 0 It
noted that many of the alleged crimes, which were committed "directly or through surro-
gate armed groups," have been widespread and systematic, thus amounting to "gross vio-
lations of human rights and humanitarian law."8"
73. ICID Report, supra note 9, 1 222.
74. Id.
75. Id. 223.
76. Id. (noting further access to the sites of incidents, protection ofwitesses, and the potential for gathering
the necessary evidence were, amongst others, of major consideration in making its selection).
77. Id. 226.
78. Id.
79. ICID Report, supra note 9, T 111.
80. See id. 240.
81. Id. 1 185.
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As to the question of genocide, the ICID acknowledged that other reports on the Darfur
crisis "have implied, and a few have determined, that the elements of the crime of genocide
are present in the patterns and nature of violations committed by the Government and its
militias." 2 It agreed that "some of the objective elements of genocide materialized in Dar-
fur""5 and, in fact, that it had
collected substantial and reliable material which tends to show the occurrence of systematic
killing of civilians belonging to particular tribes, of large-scale causing of serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the population belonging to certain tribes, and of massive and
deliberate infliction on those tribes of conditions of life bringing about their physical destruc-
tion in whole or in part (for example by systematically destroying their villages and crops, by
expelling them from their homes, and by looting their cattle), 4
The Report, however, flip-flopped and insisted that the crucial element of genocidal
intent is missing in Darfur, "at least as far as the central Government authorities are con-
cerned." s Its conclusion on this point is both intriguing and disappointing: "[l]t would
seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive
the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.186 Alex de
Waal sums up the ICID's conclusion-"[i]n short, the killings in Darfur looked like gen-
ocide but were actually a by-product of defeating the rebellion."87
The next segment examined the ICID's legal reasoning for its phony conclusion.
B. AN ANALYsIS OF ICID's RATIONALIZATIONS
According to the ICID, two elements of genocide exist in the gross violations of human
rights perpetrated by government forces in Sudan and the militias under their control. The
ICID identified the first element as "the actus reus consisting of killing, or causing serious
bodily or mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about
physical destruction."88 It identified the second element, "on the basis of a subjective stan-
dard, [as] the existence of a protected group being targeted by the authors of criminal
conduct." s9 The ICID argued that the policy of attacking, killing, and forcibly displacing
members of some tribes does not generally evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole
or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. 9°
It is not necessary to dwell on the objective element of genocide here, since the ICID
appears to have established the actus reus of genocide in Darfur.9 The ICID only insists
82. Id. T 195.
83. Id. T 507.
84. Id.
85. ICID Report, supra note 9, 507.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Alex de Waal, Deep down in Darfur, TIMEs LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Aug. 12,2005, at5 (reviewing PRUtNIER,
supra note 16).
88. ICID Report, supra note 9, at 4.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. For an analysis of the actus reus of genocide, see SCHARBAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note
17, at 151-205. In general, the material element of genocide requires proof of acts of genocide, which may also
entail proof of outcomes from those acts. In case of the Genocide Convention, three acts require proof of
results: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; and
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that there is no corresponding subjective or mens rea element to complete the crime of
genocide. What, in any event, is a genocidal intent? When and for what reasons do we label
the killing of people as genocide? Can ethnic cleansing amount to genocide? How about
deliberately inflicting conditions destructive of life? This segment examines these and re-
lated questions in the context of the ICID Report. The present writer argues that there are
several clues to discovering genocidal intent and that genocide could better be described
in shades of grey than in black and white.
1. Discovering Genocidal Intent
The central plank of genocide, and one that gives its specialty and distinguishes it from
an ordinary crime or other crimes against IHL,92 is the intent to "destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group .. . ."9 Several international criminal
tribunal decisions confirm this fundamental requirement, including the Appeals Chamber
of the ICTR, which held in Prosecutor v. Musema that "[g]enocide requires proof of an intent
[sic] to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group .... -
The gravity of the crime of genocide is reflected in the stringent requirement of specific
intent,9 also variously referred to as special intent, dolus specialis, particular intent, or geno-
cidal intent.96 The special intent of a crime has been defined as "the specific intention,
required as a constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly
seeks to produce the act charged." 97
The two elements of the special intent requirement of genocide are, first, the act or acts
must target a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group; and, second, the act or acts must
seek to destroy all or part of that group.98 The existence of a plan or policy, however, is not
a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide; it is only evidentiary in supporting the inference
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Two others do not require proof of results, though
they require a further specific intent: deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; or imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group. See Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2. In those cases where the outcome or result forms an
element of the offence, the accused may also be prosecuted for attempting to commit the crime even if no
result may be proven. See id. art. 3(d). Lastly, the material element of genocide may be either an act of com-
mission or omission and this applies to all acts enumerated in article 2 of the Genocide Convention. SeeScsABAs,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 156; and Kambanda, judgment & sentence, Case No.
ICTR 97-23-S, 40(1).
92. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, judgment, 66 (Dec. 14, 1999).
93. Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2. For a statutory analysis of each element of genocide, albeit
in relation to the ICC, see Preparatory Commission for the ICC, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/
2000/l/Add.2 (2000) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes]. The Elements of Crimes were elaborated, pursuant to
article 9 of the ICC Statute, to assist the ICC in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, and 8 of the
Statute.
94. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, judgment, 1 366 (Nov. 16, 2001) (emphasis added);
see, e.g., Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 500-09; Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, 63; Prosecutor v. Ruta-
ganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T, judgment & sentence, 49-52 (Dec. 6, 1999); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case
No. ICTR 96-13-A, judgment & sentence, 155-59 (Jan. 27, 2000).
95. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT 98-33-A, judgment, 134 (Apr. 19, 2004).
96. See, e.g., Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, judgment & sentence, 164-67 (referring to specificintent
and dolus specialis interchangeably); Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 1 498 (referring to special intent or dolus
specialis).
97. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 91 498.
98. SeeJelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, 1 66; KrsTic, Case No. IT 98-33-A, 1 550.
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of intent, though it may help to establish that the accused possessed the requisite genocidal
intent.99
The special intent characterizing genocide supposes that the alleged perpetrator of the
crime selects his victims because they are part of a group that he is seeking to destroy.
Where the goal of the perpetrator(s) of the crime is to destroy all or part of a group, it is
the "membership of the individual in a particular group rather than the identity of the
individual that is the decisive criterion in determining the immediate victims of the crime
of genocide."100 Convictions for genocide can be entered only where specific intent has
been unequivocally established. Knowledge is irrelevant in the crime of genocide, though
it is an essential element of crimes against humanity.'1' Thus, while the perpetrator's know-
ing participation in an organized or extensive attack on civilians may support a finding of
genocidal intent, it remains only the evidentiary basis from which the fact-finder may draw
this inference.Iss
The gravity and the scale of the crime of genocide ordinarily presume that several pro-
tagonists are involved in its perpetration, meaning that genocide requires a plan. Judicial
and academic opinions support this view, 03 but neither the Genocide Convention nor the
ICC Statute makes this an explicit requirement. In Kayisbema and Ruzindana, the ICTR
stressed that "although a specific plan to destroy does not constitute an element of genocide,
it would appear that it is nto easy to carry out a genocide without a plan or organization. " '04
Assuming this proposition to be correct, the avalanche of evidence points to a systematic
plan regarding the Darfur atrocities. Although the motive of each participant may differ,
the objective of the criminal enterprise remains the same. In such cases of joint participation,
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group as such must be discernible in the criminal
act itself, apart from the intent of particular perpetrators. It is then necessary to establish
whether the accused being prosecuted for genocide shared the intention that such a crime
should be carried out. 05
Proof of genocidal intent-and this is particularly significant for the purpose of this
Article-need not be by direct explicit evidence alone but may be inferred from a number
99. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, judgment, 9148 (July 5, 2001); see also Krstic, Case No.
IT 98-33-A, 225.
100. Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996, in REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., at art. 17, cmt. 6,
U.N. Doc. A/51/10(SUPP) (1996) [hereinafter ILC Draft], cited with approval inJelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T,
67.
It is an externally perceptible quality or characteristic which the victim has in common with the other
members of the group, which makes him distinct from the rest of society in the criminal mind of his
attacker and which for that very reason causes the attacker to commit the crime against such marked
and indicated individual. (emphasis supplied).
Cf PIETER DROST, GENOCIDE, in THE CRIME OF STATE 124 (A.W Sythoffed., 1959).
101. See THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 340 (Antonio Cassese
et al. eds., 2002) (under customary international law, "it is only for crimes against humanity [and not for
genocide] that knowledge of the widespread or systematic practice is required").
102. See Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, judgment, 9 223.
103. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61, 9194 (July 11,
1996);Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, 1 655 (confirming the requirement of a plan as an evidentiary matter even
if it is not explicitly part of the definition within the Genocide Convention); LEMRIN, Axis RULE, supra note
37, at 79.
104. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, 194.
105. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, T 497.
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of facts and circumstances. These circumstances include-and the ICID itself cites to these
authorities-
the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against
that same group, whether... committed by the same offender or by others[,] ... the scale of
atrocities committed, their general nature, [whether committed] in a region or a country ...
the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of
a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups[,] ... the general political
doctrine which gave rise to the acts[,] ... the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts[,
or] the perpetration of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to
violate the very foundation of the group-acts which are not in themselves covered by the list
... but which are committed as part of the same pattern of conduct.10 6
Inferences could also be drawn from
the number of group members affected[;] ... the physical targeting of the group or their
property; the use of derogatory language toward members of the targeted group; the weapons
employed and the extent of bodily injury; the methodical way of planning; the systematic
manner of killing[; and] the relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction
of a group.107
Sexual violence has also been held to constitute an integral part of the process of destruc-
tion, as in the Akayesu case, in which the ICTR Trial Chamber held that rape and sexual
violence constituted genocide, in the same way as any other act, as long as they were com-
mitted with specific intent to destroy a covered group in whole or in part. 08 The ICID
Report fails to answer, for example, whether the systematic rape and sexual violence in
Darfur were merely parts of counter-insurgency warfare or, as the present writer insists,
were deliberate acts with intent to destroy the targeted three ethnic communities in Darfur.
How about efforts by the GoS, as gathered by witnesses and documentary evidence, to erase
traces of mass graves of executed civilians from the targeted group?
The ICID Report concedes that some government individuals may have acted with in-
dividual genocidal intent but it fails to attribute such actions to the state. Yet, as Fletcher
and Ohlin argue, the evidence of intent will almost always be found at the individual level,
and it is difficult to understand why genocidal intent to the group cannot be established.-n
It is amazing how the ICID could see the fern seed of systematic and widespread violations
of human rights in Darfur amounting to crimes against humanity, but failed to see the
elephant of genocidal acts. It is true that the Genocide Convention identifies genocidal
intent in a precise way, meaning that much legal work is needed to broaden the Convention
to include genocidal outcomes as secondary impact of other aims. But the Convention may
well be useful mainly for prosecution after the fact, since it is almost impossible to reach a
conclusion about genocide while it is actually occurring,"t° as is the case in Darfur.
106. Id. 9J 523-24.
107. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, judgment & sentence, 1 166; Kayisbema & Ruzindana, Case No.
ICTR 95-1-T, 9 93, 527; cf. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, 47.
108. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 508.
109. See Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 49, at 456.
110. See de Waal, supra note 87, at 4.
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2. Can Deliberately Inflicting Conditions Destructive of Life amount to Genocide?
The ICID admits that there has been a large-scale destruction of villages throughout the
three communities in Darfur (the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit).' Nearly two million dis-
placed Darfurians remain in camps and towns, entirely dependent on humanitarian aid.
They cannot return to their homes and farms due to ongoing attacks, rape, looting, and
assault by the GoS and the militias. Yet, the ICID failed to see any genocidal intent from
these atrocious acts. The truth is that not all acts listed in article 2 of the Genocide Convention
necessarily lead to death. The Convention defines genocide to include "[d]eliberately in-
flicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part .... " I The ICTR has interpreted acts constituting "conditions of life
calculated to bring about [an ethnic group's] physical destruction [as] subjecting a group of
people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential
medical services below minimum requirement.""11 There is no reason, other than a decep-
tive attempt to suppress the truth, to suggest that the Darfur situation does not accurately
fit these descriptions.
The crime of genocide does not imply the actual extermination of a group in its entirety,
but it is understood as such once any one of the acts mentioned in the Genocide Convention
is committed with the specific intent to destroy "in whole or in part."" 4 There is consid-
erable debate whether the phrase "in whole or in part" requires a considerable number of
individuals to amount to genocide. The ILC believes that the part targeted must be sig-
nificant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole, since "the crime of genocide
by its very nature requires the intention to destroy at least a substantial part of a particular
group.""' Benjamin Whitaker shares the same opinion, arguing that "'[in part' would seem
to imply a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or
else a significant section of a group, such as its leadership."16 In Prosecutor v. Cl6ment Kay-
ishema and Obed Ruzindana,"' the ICTR Trial Chamber held that the term in part in the
Genocide Convention "requires the intention to destroy a considerable number of individ-
uals who are part of the group." ' s Similarly, in interpreting Article 4 of the ICTY Statute,
the Appeals Chamber held that "[t]he intent requirement of genocide ... is ... satisfied
where evidence shows that the alleged perpetrator intended to destroy at least a substantial
part of the protected group."' 19
The second view, and one that the present author shares, is that the expression "in whole
or in part" indicates that the offender need not intend to destroy the entire group but only
111. See ICID Report, supra note 9, 9 3.
112. Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2(c).
113. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 1 506; cf. Manashaw, supra note 15, at 313 (asserting that "[g]enocide
is therefore not merely an act of massive killing and certain non-lethal acts may also constitute genocide.").
114. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, T 497.
115. ILC Draft, supra note 100, at 89, 93-104.
116. Whitaker, supra note 26, 1 29; see also SCHABAs, GNOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at
238; ROBINSON, supra note 41, at 63 (explaining that a perpetrator of genocide must possess the intent to destroy
a substantial number of individuals constituting the targeted group); and The Genocide Convention: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong. 22 (1981).
117. See Kayisbema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, 9T 97, 123.
118. Id. 1 97.
119. See, e.g., Krstic, Case No. IT 98-33-A, 1 12; see alsoJelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, T 82; cf. Prosecutor
v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-lA-T, judgement, 164 (June 7, 2001) (holding, "the intention to destroy
must target at least a substantial part of the group").
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a substantial portion of it.12° The Genocide Convention does not specify a threshold number
of deaths that must occur to constitute genocide; neither are large numbers necessary. 2' In
1982, a General Assembly resolution described the massacres at Sabra and Shatila as gen-
ocide, though the victims numbered in few hundreds.22 In any event, the determination of
when the targeted part is substantial enough to meet the requirement of the Genocide
Convention involves a number of considerations. One consideration will be the numeric
size of the targeted part of the group, evaluated not only in absolute terms but also in
relation to the overall size of the entire group. The prominence of the targeted part within
the group can be a useful consideration, that is to say, "[i]f a specific part of the group is
emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding
that the part qualifies as substantial .... ,123
Tracing the evolution of this crime under international law, Schabas argues that"[g]enocide
did not necessarily imply the immediate destruction of a national or ethnic group, but rather
different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of the
group, with the aim of annihilating the group as such." 124 The objectives of a genocidal
plan, according to Lemkin, is the "disintegration of the political and social institutions, of
culture, language, national feelings, religions and the economic existence of national groups,
and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of
the individuals belonging to such groups." 125 Lemkin's assertion raises the question whether
the destruction in question includes the national, linguistic, cultural, or other identity of a
particular group. According to the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, "an enterprise attacking
only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate
these elements which give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the com-
munity would not fall under the definition of genocide."2 6
3. Can Ethnic Cleansing amount to Genocide?
Some speak of Darfur in terms of ethnic cleansing,127 and the ICID Report confirms such
conclusions. 2 ' According to Human Rights Watch, there is
credible evidence that the government of Sudan has purposefully sought to remove by violent
means the Masalit and Fur populations from large parts of Darfur in operations that amount
to ethnic cleansing. The attacks directed against civilians, the burning of their villages, the
mass killings of persons under their control, the forced displacement of populations, the de-
struction of their food stocks, livelihoods and the looting of their livestock by government and
militia forces are not merely a scorched earth tactic or an element of a counterinsurgency
120. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 55, 60.
121. John Quigley, State Responsibility for Ethnic Cleansing, 32 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 341, 350 (1999).
122. See G.A. Res. 37/123D, U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/123 (Dec.16, 1982).
123. See Krstic, Case No. IT 98-33-A, 1 12.
124. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 17, at 27.
125. LEMKIN, AXiS RULE, supra note 37, at 79.
126. Krstic, Case No. IT 98-33-A, T 580; cf. SCH".As, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 17, at
229 (arguing that the drafting history of the Genocide Convention would not sustain a construction of the
genocidal intent that extends beyond intent at physical destruction); see also ILC Draft, supra note 100, at 90-91.
127. See, e.g., Hilary Anderson, Ethnic Cleansing Blights Sudan, BBC News, May 27, 2004, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/programmes/from-our-own-correspondent/375287 1.stn.
128. See ICID Report, supra note 9, 194 (noting that "some reports conclude that elements of persecution
and 'ethnic cleansing' are present in the pattern of destruction and displacement").
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strategy. Their aim appears to be to remove those ethnic groups from large areas of the region
and redistribute this population, mainly into the vicinity of government-controlled towns
where they can be concentrated, confined and controlled. 2 '
The term ethnic cleansing is often used for the political purpose of avoiding the charge
of genocide. 3 0 Although the phrase was excluded from the Genocide Convention negoti-
ations, the General Assembly, in 1992, evokes "the abhorrent policy of 'ethnic cleansing',
which is a form of genocide."3' The General Assembly has reaffirmed its position in several
other resolutions. 32 In general, resolutions of the General Assembly are not binding rules
of international law; but they could "provide evidence important for establishing the exis-
tence of a rule or the emergence of an opiniojuris."133 What is ethnic cleansing? A UN
Commission of Experts defined the phrase as a
purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-
inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geo-
graphic areas.... This purpose appears to be the occupation of territory to the exclusion of
the purged group or groups.
134
In the context of the ICTY, the crimes involved in ethnic cleansing have generally been
characterized as either crimes against humanity or war crimes, and the extent to which they
are considered as genocide depends on the facts of each. In some cases, the ICTY has held
that exceptionally grave forms of ethnic cleansing may constitute genocide, a crime which,
by definition, always arises out of persecution-type crimes against humanity.ss At times,
the Tribunal has invited the Prosecutor to consider amending an indictment when, as in
the Nikolic case, 36 the policy of ethnic cleansing took the form of discriminatory acts of
extreme seriousness tending to show its genocidal character.
129. Darur Destroyed, supra note 11, at 40 (noting further that
[tlhe subsequent denial of humanitarian assistance to this population by the government of Sudan, in
conditions where the population has been rendered entirely dependent on relief, can also be considered
as part of a strategy to weaken and perhaps destroy a large proportion of the displaced population and
prevent their return to their home villages.).
130. See Manashaw, supra note 15, at 303 ("Defining a crime to be an act of genocide theoretically forces
the international community to take action, while defining it as an act of ethnic cleansing may not.").
131. The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc. A/Res/47/121, UN Doc. A/47/PV91, at 99.
132. See, e.g., Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Violations of Human
Rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), UN Doc. A/Res/48/153; Rape and Abuse of Women in the Areas of
Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. A/Res/48/143; id. UN Doc. AIResI49I205; id. UN Doc.
A/Res/50/192; and id. UN Doc. A/Res/51/115. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.Cj. 226, 70 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons case] (stressing that "a series of resolutions may
show the gradual evolution of the opiniojuris required for the establishment of a new rule," id.).
133. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996I.CJ. 226,1 70[hereinafter
Nuclear Weapons case] (stressing that "a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opiniojuris
required for the establishment of a new rule," id.).
134. The Secretary-General, Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), 130, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994) quoted
in Darfur Destroyed, supra note 11, at 39.
135. SeeJelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, 68.
136. See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case IT-94-2-R61, Decision on the Review of Indictment pursuant to Rule
61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, (Oct. 20, 1995).
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In the second Srebrenica indictment of November 16, 1995, against Radovan Karadzic
and Ratko Mladic, Judge Riad, in affirming the indictment, considered, inter alia, that
[t]he mass executions described in the indictment were evidently systematic, being organised
by the military and political hierarchy of the Serbian administration of Pale, apparently with
close support from elements of the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro). These executions were committed in the context of a broader policy of 'ethnic
cleansing' which is directed against the Bosnian Muslim population and which also includes
massive deportations [against the Bosnian Muslim population]. This policy aims at creating
new borders by violently changing the national or religious composition of the population. As
a result of this policy, the Muslim population of Srebrenica was totally banished from the area.
The policy of 'ethnic cleansing' referred to above presents, in its ultimate manifestation, geno-
cidal characteristics. Furthermore, in this case, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, which is specific to genocide, may clearly be in-
ferred from the gravity of the 'ethnic cleansing' practiced in Srebrenica and its surrounding
areas, i.e. principally, the mass killings of Muslims which occurred after the fall of Srebrenica
in July 1995, which were committed in circumstances manifesting an almost unparalleled
cruelty.
37
The present writer submits that the policy of ethnic cleansing in Darfur "presents, in its
ultimate manifestation, genocidal characteristics," to borrow the expression of the ICTY.
The ICID's reluctance to characterize the ethnic cleansing in Darfur as genocide clearly
reflects the world's established caution in applying the term, despite the reality of mass
extermination of persons for racial, ethnic, religious, or other reasons that has repeatedly
thrust itself forward for judgment and reaction.
IV. An Escape from Reason
This final Part assesses the ICID Report and examines the hypocrisies of other inter-
national actors in the Darfur saga.
A. MORE FICTION THAN FACT
The present writer submits that the ICID Report is an escape from reason or, at best, a
reason invented to justify a pre-determined result. The Report flies in the face of jurispru-
dence and throws overboard the "object and purpose"'38 of the Genocide Convention. The
ICID deliberately defines the Darfur crisis in ways that make it less urgent and less de-
manding of the international community to intervene and suppress the genocide. By failing
to call a spade a spade, the ICID has created a fictitious and factitious Darfur that is com-
pletely different from reality. It takes only an ostrich not to notice the gap between the
ICID Report and the harvest of ethnically induced murder and mayhem in Darfur.
The ICID Report is particularly absurd because it naively relies on the official explana-
tions by the GoS,"19 as if the ICID expected the CoS to admit to acts of genocide! Con-
137. JoNEs & POWLES, supra note 35, at 146 (citing Nikolic, Case IT-94-2-R61).
138. Cf Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, 1 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.TS. 331 ("A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose" (emphasis added).
139. See ICID Report, supra note 9, at 3 ("In their discussions with the Commission, Government of the
Sudan officials stated that any attacks carried out by Government armed forces in Darfur were for counter-
insurgency purposes and were conducted on the basis of military imperatives.").
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versely, the ICID's determination may have been based on a higher standard of proof, but,
as Holly Burkhalter argues, "invoking the [Genocide Convention] in situations where it
clearly applies is not necessarily the most effective strategy for inspiring public support for
action to prevent genocide and save those at risk." 14 "Could it not be argued," asks de
Waal, "that genocide is a predictable corollary of counter-insurgency conducted in a certain
manner? And is there not reason enough to deduce as much from the previous two decades
of warfare in Sudan-and indeed from other modern wars?"'
14
It is not clear if the ICID considered the functional need to prevent perpetrators of the
Darfur mayhem from making capital of its Report and continuing to kill with impunity,
given that the Report downplays the orchestrated catastrophe in Darfur that inevitably will
produce obscene human mortality in the years to come. It is possible, even probable, that
the sheer magnitude of the Darfur atrocities overwhelms the international community,
leading to what Burkhalter paradoxically calls "'promoting the many at the expense of the
few."' 142 It could also justifiably be argued that the ICID probably did not want to saddle
the UN with yet another African mess, since it is easier to respond with aid and other
political platitudes at the end of such pogroms than risk the few at the expense of the many.
The ICID Report has, thus, strengthened the historical ineffectiveness of the UN in com-
bating genocide, an ineffectiveness that is not only a common knowledge but also scandalous.
The UN's reaction to the Rwanda genocide readily comes to mind. In Rwanda, officials
of the UN Secretariat failed to provide the UNSC with early warning of extremist plans
to kill thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Three months before the genocide, General
Dallaire-the UN commander in Rwanda-sent a fax to Kofi Annan, then head of the UN
peacekeeping, warning that militias could exterminate 1000 Tutsis every twenty minutes.143
Rather than present the facts to the UNSC, Annan urged General Dallaire to present the
information to the Rwandan President, who was responsible for arming the militias in the
first place.'" When the genocide eventually commenced, the UNSC failed to respond;14
the original peacekeeping force of 2500 was scaled down to an ineffectual squad of 270, on
the orders of the UNSC!'46 On April 30, 1994, the UNSC issued a lame presidential state-
ment echoing the terms of articles 1 and 2 of the Genocide Convention but deliberately
avoiding the word genocide. The statement, which the French National Assembly later
described as "l'hypocrisie la plus totale"'47-though France itself was a major accomplice
140. Holly Burkhalter, Preventing Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 98 ASIL PROC. 41, 42 (2004).
141. de Waal, supra note 87, at 4.
142. Burkhalter, supra note 140, at 42 (arguing that "the unique characteristics of genocide-its broad reach
and large number of victims-.., appears to undermine practical strategies to save anyone").
143. See Power, Analysis, supra note 2.
144. See id.
145. See Chairman of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility T 87, delivered to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A159/565 (2004) [hereinafterA More Secure World].
146. See UN Doc. S/Res/912 (1994), 1 8; see also Philip Gourevitch, The Genocide Fax, THE NEW YORKER,
May 11, 1998, at 42, 46; and generally PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE
WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998).
147. France, Assemblee nationale, Rapport d'information depose en application de l'anticle 145 do Regle-
ment par la Mission d'information de la Commission de la defense nationale et des forces armies et de la
Commission des affairs etrangeres, sur les operations militaries menees par la France, d'autres pays et I'ONU
au Rwanda 1990 et 1994, Paris, 1999, at 307, cited in See ScHAaAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 17, at 460.
SPRING 2006
60 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
in the genocide'141-read: "the Security Council recalls that the killing of members of an
ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes
a crime punishable by international law." 149 For the record, Nigeria was one of the few
African states then sitting on the UNSC; Is° it still is one of the states that have not yet
ratified the Genocide Convention, though it prides itself as "the giant of Africa."
"A lot," says Power, "has happened since Rwanda. Rwanda has made a profound differ-
ence in people's awareness of the possibility that genocide happens now and doesn't just
happen in black and white."' In 2001, an International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty proposed the idea that sovereign states have the primary responsibility
to protect their citizens from such avoidable catastrophe as Rwanda and that where they
are unwilling or unable to do so, the international community has a secondary responsibility
to act.52 The UN echoed the same sentiment in 2004,' s3 thus affirming that there is some-
thing inherent in the nature of the international system that obliges it to act upon a duty.
The cancer of bestiality, in particular, must be the concern of everyone. Regrettably, the
Darfur genocide has exposed the great gap that still exists between articulating a principle
and fulfilling it; rather than act as a firewall against the ongoing genocide in Darfur, the
UNSC has become an undertaker for the GoS.
Painfully, the essence of the current failure is not that the machinery that comprises the
international order has broken down; the system, as Power insists, is working.5 4 The es-
sence of the problem is simply that there is no political will-no community-amongstates
that comprise the so-called international community; it lies in "a persistent unwillingness
to risk blood and treasure in defense of humanity."'55 It is really alarming that while the
Khartoum-Janjaweed criminal alliance is systematically killing and expelling black Africans
from their homes and perfecting its genocidal mission in Darfur, the international com-
munity is busy debating the threshold for the determination of genocide.
The next segment examines the complicity of some powerful states and institutions in
the Darfur tragedy.
B. AcCESSORIEs BEFORE AND AFTER THE FACT
The first country to consider in the word-mincing and hesitation game is the United
States whose policy on genocide has been anything but consistent. During the Rwanda
genocide of 1994, the United States refused to invoke the term genocide in its early weeks
148. See LINDA R. MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN RWANDA'S GENOCIDE (2000)
(depicting the human tragedy that was allowed to unfold in Rwanda and the role of several governments,
notably France, in fuelling this process).
149. Statement of the President of the Security Council Condemning the Slaughter of Civilians in Kigali
and Other Parts of Rwanda, UN Doc. S/PRST/994/21 (Apr. 30, 1994).
150. See id. n.85.
151. Power, Analysis, supra note 2.
152. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001).
153. See A More Secure World, supra note 145, 201 ("Where is a growing acceptance that while sovereign
Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they
are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community").
154. See Power, Analysis, supra note 2.
155. Schaack, supra note 19, at 1103.
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lest, as Samantha Power observed, the terminology have legal implications necessitating
the United States, a reluctant party to the Genocide Convention,,5 6 to take action to prevent
and punish it."' In the case of Darfur, the U.S. Congress, "in an unprecedented action,""5 8
passed a resolution in July 2004, declaring that the GoS was committing genocide in Darfur
and urging the international community to respond through humanitarian intervention.'5 9
The U.S. House of Representatives approved the resolution by "the convincing margin of
422 votes to none-and the Senate 'concurred.""-" The resolution called on the UN to
assert leadership by calling "the atrocities being committed in Darfur, Sudan by its rightful
name: 'genocide. ' "" 6' It urged the U.S. Government to call events in Darfur genocide and
to consider humanitarian intervention should the UNSC fail to act.
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Meanwhile, following an earlier Congressional resolution in July 2004, the U.S. State
Department dispatched the Atrocities Documentation Team to refugee camps in Chad to
ascertain whether the GoS was committing genocide. The investigation lasted from July to
September and documented widespread atrocities along ethnic lines. The investigators in-
terviewed about 1136 refugees and displaced Darfurians, 46 percent of which were the
Zaghawa tribe, 8 percent the Fur tribe, and 30 percent the Massalit tribe. 63 Following this
investigation, on September 9, 2004, the then Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who per-
sonally visited Darfur in June 2004, appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. He unequivocally stated that the GoS was committing genocide in Darfur: "'When
we reviewed the evidence'... 'we concluded-I concluded-that genocide has been com-
mitted in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility
and that genocide may still be occurring."' and that "'no new action is dictated by [the
genocide] determination."'I64 President George Bush, in an address to the General Assem-
bly in September 2004, also referred to the atrocities in Darfur as genocide. 65
Khartoum was initially uncomfortable with the United States characterization of the
Darfur,66 but was later emboldened by the fact that this superpower was merely barking
and was not ready to move its military might to arrest the "ongoing genocide" in Darfur.
Some commentators argue, and there is every reason to agree, that Powell's goal in his
156. It took forty years for the US to ratify the Genocide Convention: President Truman asked the Senate
to give its advice and consent to the treaty in June 1949; President Ronald Reagan deposited the signed treaty,
with reservations, in the UN in November 1998. See generally LAWRENCEJ. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION (1981) (examining the politics of ratification of the Genocide Convention by the
United States).
157. See generally SAMANTjtA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002)
(examining how Americans have very rarely marshaled their might to stop genocide and mass terror against
Armenians, European Jews, Cambodians, Iraqi Kurds, Bosnians, and Rwandans).
158. Schaack, supra note 19, at 1109.
159. H.R. Con. Res. 467, 108th Cong. (2004). The resolution was unanimous with 12 members not voting.
160. The World Notices Darfur, THE ECONOMIST, July 31, 2004, at 9.
161. H.R. Con. Res. 467, 6.
162. See id. T] 1.
163. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR, State. Publ'n No. 11182 (Sept. 2004).
164. Samantha Power, It's Not Enough to Call it Genocide, TIME, Oct. 4, 2004, at 36, 59 (citing Colin Powell,
U.S. Secretary of State, testimony before Congress on September 9, 2004); see also Paul Richter & Maggie
Farley, U.S. Declares Darfur Crisis is Genocide, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A3.
165. See George W Bush, U.S. President, President's Statement on Violence in Darfur, Sudan (Sept. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040909- I O.hnl.
166. See William Maclean, Sudan Accuses U.S. of Using Darfur Crisis as a Ploy, NAT'L POST, Sept. 11, 2004,
at A9.
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genocide determination was only meant to increase political pressure on Khartoum since
the July Congressional resolution had little effect in preventing the Khartoum-Janjaweed
atrocities.167 The present writer also locates the ambivalence of the US Government in its
current fatigue in the messy Iraq war that has caused the United States both unexpected
high casualties and, with Abu Ghraib, 68 embarrassment. As Richard Haass, president of
the Council on Foreign Relations, argues, "'[t]he war of choice against Iraq has narrowed
choices elsewhere for U.S. foreign policy'....,169
Another reason for the United States' failure to demonstrate leadership over the Darfur
genocide might have been the fear of domestic political backlash, given its shambolic in-
tervention in Somalia in 1993. The Somalia tragedy has also been used to explain America's
inaction in Rwanda in 1994. In October 1993, at the precise moment Rwanda appeared on
the agenda of the UNSC, the United States lost eighteen soldiers in Somalia, a loss that
made it politically awkward for the country to immediately become involved in another
peacekeeping or enforcement action. 70 The Clinton Administration even instructed its
representative at the UNSC not to use the word genocide in the context of the Rwanda
debacle.
171
In the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, the International Panel of Eminent Person-
alities set up by the defunct Organization of African Unity to investigate the genocide
recommended reparations for Rwanda and its victims to be paid by states that failed to
act. 72 In response, Richard Boucher, the United States Department of State spokesperson,
stated, inter alia, that the United States was
very active in supporting the aid effort. The other thing ... to address is the President's
statement that he said we need to learn the lessons, we need to do everything we can in our
power to help build the future. We have taken several steps to address the threat of resurgent
genocide in the region and, more generally, improve the ability of the international community
to deal with the issue of genocide, should we again have to face that task.
73
President Bill Clinton also tried some damage control in 1998, when he publicly apolo-
gized for the failure in Rwanda:
The international community, together with nations of Africa, must bear its share of respon-
sibility for this tragedy.... We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should
167. See David S. Cloud, Powell Cites Sudan for Genocide but Calls U.N. Sanctions Unlikely, WAL ST. J., Sept.
10, 2004, at A6.
168. See, e.g., James Risen, G.J.'s are Accused of Abusing Iraqi Captives, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at Al 5.
169. Glenn Kessler, President Signals No Major Shift in Foreign Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2004, at Al; see
also Louis Klarevas, W Version 2.0: Foreign Policy in the Second Bush Term, 29 FLETCHER E WORLD Arr. 165, 170
(2005) (arguing that the limited American response to the Darfur genocide exemplifies the inability of the U.S.
to address complex humanitarian crises, preferring to pass such crises to regional forces).
170. See Organization of African Unity International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Rwanda: The Prevent-
able Genocide T 12.33, 12.36, delivered to the Secretary-General, OAU Doc. IPEP/PANEL (May 29, 2000) (re-
porting that the murder of the 18 US soldiers in Somalia traumatized the US Government and proved disastrous
for Rwanda); see also Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 Am. J. lcT'L L.
677, 693 (2000).
171. See Douglas Jehl, Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings Genocide, New York Times, June 10,
1994, at A8.
172. See The Preventable Genocide, supra note 170, T 12.36.
173. Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State Daily Press Briefing at 6-7 (July 7, 2000), in Sean
D. Murphy, OAU Report Regarding Rwandan Genocide, 94 Am. J. INT'L. L. 692, 694-95 (2000).
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not have allowed the refugee camps [in Zaire] to become safe haven for the killers. We did not
immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide .... All over the world there
were people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the
depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.'7 4
In the triumphant aftermath of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in
Kosovo in 1999, President Clinton made a rash pledge that America was ready to intervene
and halt future genocide anywhere in the world:
[w]e can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or Central Europe,
or any other place, if someone comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en mass
because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it is within our power to
stop it, we will stop it.1
7
5
Less than a decade after, the United States has defaulted in paying this promissory note,
despite its obvious ability to stop the terror in Darfur. The United States is even now taking
pro-GoS policies; the Bush Administration recently requested Congress not to force sanc-
tions on Khartoum.176 Doublespeak is clearly one of the biggest problems of contemporary
times and a great hindrance to the protection of human rights.
The United States is not alone in this word-mincing and hesitation game; some other
powerful members of the international community with vested economic interest in Sudan
are also engaged in a conspiracy of silence over Darfur. The Darfur genocide itself is not
a threat to the economic interest of these states, which probably explains why they are
reluctant to react in ways that might anger Khartoum and hurt their economic interest in
Sudan as a whole. Russia sells fighter jets to Khartoum, including, probably, the powerful
MI-24 combat helicopters that routinely bomb the Darfur villages. Chinese oil firms also
have serious interest in Sudan, making it unlikely for these countries to take actions that
will hurt their interests in Khartoum.'
In September 2004, the European Parliament voted 566 to 6 to declare that the GoS has
committed acts that tantamount to genocide in Darfur and urged the GoS to arrest the
perpetrators.'I 8 The same month, the German Defense Minister, speaking for the German
Government, also declared that genocide was occurring in Darfur. Nothing has come out
of these declarations, largely because some European companies, such as Germany's Sie-
mens, have commercial interests in Khartoum. 7 9 In April 2005-three months after the
ICID submitted its Report-Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary, said that genocide was
174. See President Bill Clinton, remarks in Kigali, Rwanda (Mar. 24, 1998), in HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING
WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 155 (1999).
175. President Bill Clinton, remarks to the Kosovo Force (KFOR), Skopje, Macedonia (June 22, 1999), in
HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? TOWARDS A DIPLOMACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 254 (2001).
176. See Guy Dinmore, Zoellick Signals US Policy Sbift on Darfur, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005, at 6; Nicholas
D. Kristof, Day 113 of the President's Silence, THE N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2005, at 25.
177. See Sudan can't wait, THE ECoNoMIST, July 31, 2004, at 11.
178. Motion for a Resolution on the Humanitarian Situation in Sudan, Eur. Parl. Doc. (B5-0065/2004)
(2004); contra Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings: Sudan/Darfur, 13303/1/04 Rev I
(Oct. 13, 2004) (documenting widespread killing of civilians and burning of villages in Darfur but failing to
employ the term genocide.); see also Reuters, Europe Sees No Genocide in Sudan Region, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10,
2004, at A3.
179. See Eric Reeves, The "Two Darfurs": Redefining a Crisis for Political Purposes, SUDAN TRIBUNE, May 20,
2005, available at www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id-article = 9675.
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occurring in Darfur; but, like the United States and others, nothing has been evident in
British policy that is commensurate with such a determination.s 0 Eric Reeves notes that
British commercial firms, such as Weir Pumps and Glasgow, continue their normal business
with Khartoum.'81 For the European Union (EU), Darfur has become something of an
embarrassment, especially as EU members of the UNSC have disagreed on several occa-
sions on sanctions against Khartoum or conspired to delay other actions. 8 2 In January 2005,
the month that ICID submitted its report to the UN, the EU gave Euro 50 million in aid
to the GoS, promising another Euro 400 million, depending on "improvement of the sit-
uation in the Darfur."18 3
Of course, no measurable security improvement has occurred in Darfur. A contrario, the
"ongoing genocide" is set to run its full course as the Khartoum-Janjaweed alliance con-
solidates its attack, including attacks on IDPs who try to return to their homes.'sa There is
also a growing insecurity for humanitarian operations. s5
The most absurd characterization of the Darfur pogrom came from the African Union
(AU) Assembly, which decided, in July 2004, that, "though the humanitarian situation in
Darfur is serious, it can not be defined as a genocide."'1 6 The AU Assembly did not make
any attempt to investigate the crisis before hastily drawing its absurd conclusion, unlike the
UNSC, at least. Yet the AU is the only international organization which Constitutive Act' 87
gives it the right to intervene in Member States in cases of grave circumstances. One of its
operating principles is the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to
a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide,
and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace
and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace
and Security Council. Is8 Sudan is a State Party to the AU Act.
The Decision on Darfur has encouraged other Member States of the AU to stand by
while the GoS continues its genocidal acts in Darfur. Yet, the AU Assembly has stressed
that "the crisis [in Darfur] should be addressed with utmost urgency to avoid further es-
calation .. 1.."819 The African Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) that the AU itself set up to
180. See Getbin Chamberlain, Fear Hits Harvest in Fresh Threat to Darfur, THE SCOTSMAN, May 3, 2005, at 23.
181. See Reeves, supra note 179.
182. See Jeppe Plenge Trautner, The Politics of Multinational Crisis Management: The European Union's
Response to Darfur, at 3 (Sept. 13, 2005), Ph.D. dissertation, Aalborg University, available at http://www.ihis.
aau.dk/-trautner/docs/Trautner2005b-03 .pdf.
183. Id. (citing European Commission 2005).
184. See generally Entrencbing Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur, 17 HvM.
RTS WATCH I etseq. (Dec. 2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfstrl205/darfurl2OStext.pdhere-
inafter Entrenching Impunity].
185. See BBC News, Second Sudan Aid Worker Arrested (May 31, 2005), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/459591 1stm. Paul Foreman was arrested by Sudanese authorities on May 31, 2005, on the unproven
claim that an MSF report on rape published on March 8 violated Sudanese law and that the report is "false."
Id.
186. Assembly of the African Union, Decision on Darfur, AU 3d Ord. Sess. July 2004, 1 2, AU Doc.
Assembly/AU/Dec.54 (M1) (2004) [hereinafter Decision on Darfur].
187. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, AU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15, 479 (2000) (as
amended by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the AU, July 11, 2003).
188. Id. at art. 4(h).
189. Decision on Darfur, supra note 186, 2.
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monitor and observe compliance with all the ceasefire agreements,-g in particular the
N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement' 9' between the GoS and the rebel groups, has generally
been beset with poor logistical planning and lack of funds. As if to trivialize a grave tragedy,
the AU Assembly declared, in January 2006, that President EI-Bashir of Sudan would as-
sume leadership of the AU when the term of the current Chairperson Sassou Nguesso-a
former coup maker from the Republic of Congo-expires in 2007. The relevant AU Dec-
laration reads, inter alia, that
[t]he leaders expressed their appreciation for the initiative taken by H.E. President Omar
Hassan AI-Bashir to accept the postponement of his term of Chairmanship for the [AU] until
2007. The leaders consider this gesture to be a true reflection of the great sense of responsibility
and leadership demonstrated by President AI-Bashir. The leaders agreed after extensive con-
sultations that the Sudan will assume the Chairmanship of the Union in the year 2007.92
Earlier, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)-the "standing decision-making or-
gan for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts" in Africa 191-allowed Su-
dan to chair its meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2005.194 In 2004, the African
Group nominated Sudan to the UN Commission on Human Rights, 9 notwithstanding
that Khartoum despises human rights with impunity. One has to be overly optimistic to
still believe that the AU vision and mission, if they ever existed, have not irretrievably
derailed.
V. Conclusion: Never Again or Ever Again?
The importance of national sovereignty in the international legal order might explain
the historical ineffectiveness of the UN in policing the internal activities and especially
atrocities of its Member States. As Pierre van den Berghe observed, "[tihe U.N. is first and
foremost an organization of states, not of nations, and since most states are, in fact, threat-
ened by the claims of nations, it is little wonder that the U.N. is pro-state and anti-
nation."' 96 In recent years, however, the UN has emphatically stated that "'the sovereignty
190. The initial contingent of the AMIS was 2,000, episodically deployed; the current force level is approx-
imately 7,000. See Communiqu6 of the 17th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, AU Doc. PSC/PR/
Comm.(XVII), 4 (Oct. 20, 2004) (enhancing the AMIS).
191. N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://www.darfurinfor
mation.com/cf-ceasefire-agreement.shsmsl. The N'Djamena Agreement was facilitated by the United States
and the EU and signed by the two main opposition groups-the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM)-and the CoS on April 8, 2004, taking effect on April 11. The Agreement
included a GoS commitment to disarm the Janjaweed militia and a protocol providing for humanitarian assis-
tance in Darfur. All parties to the Darfur conflict, in particular the GoS, have repeatedly and routinely breached
the N'Djamena and subsequent agreements.
192. Declaration by the Assembly of the AU, AU Assembly 6th Ord. Sess., AU Doc. Assembly/AU/
Decl.2(Vl) (Jan. 2006).
193. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, adopted
9 July 2002, art. 2 11, available at www.africa-union.org.
194. See Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? supra note 20, at 13.
195. For a list of current members of the UN Commission on Human Rights, available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chrmem.hm.
196. Pierre van den Berghe, cited in KupER, GENOCIDE, supra note 21, at 161.
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of states must no longer be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights,"'19 though
it is difficult to reconcile such an outburst with its inaction or indifference in Darfur. As
Lewis Carrol instructs readers of his Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, "the best way to
explain it is to do it. '
'
19
Incidentally, Darfur emerged on the international scene at about the same time as the
10th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide. Like in Rwanda, the international community's
lame response to the Darfur genocide indicates that it has learnt nothing from past failures
and that it is doomed perpetually to repeat history, with the hope of never again becoming
the reality of ever again.199 There may not always be an immediate price to pay for being a
bystander in crisis afflicting developing countries, including attempts by some of Africa's
brutal regimes to wipe out minorities in their midst. But a continuous collective conspiracy
of blindness and silence amidst genocide and other gross violations of human rights will
eventually obliterate the residue of legitimacy of the international security system.
197. Annan Backs Individual Over State, BBC NEws (Dec. 10, 2001), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2lhil
world/europe/I 701605.stm (trumpeting the need to concentrate on individual rights); cf. A More Secure Worl,
supra note 145, 1 200 ("The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal
acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic
cleansing, which can properly be considered a threat to international security and as such provoke action by
the Security Council"); The Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peace-Keeping, 17, U.N. Doc. S/241 11, A/47/277 (June 17, 1992) (that "(tlhe time of absolute and exclusive
sovereignty.., has passed").
198. LEwIs CARROL, ALICE'S ADvENTURES IN WONDERLAND 26 (1898).
199. Cf Simon Chersterman, Never Again ...and Again: Law, Order, and the Gender of War Crimes in Bosnia
and Beyond, 22 YAE J. Ir'L L. 299, 316 (1997).
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